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Since the advent of Napster, the idea of peer-to-peer (P2P) architectures being applied to 
file-sharing applications has become popular, spawning other P2P networks like Gnutella, 
Morpheus, Kazaa, and BitTorrent. This growth in P2P development has nearly eradicated the 
idea of the traditional client-server structure in the file-sharing model, now placing emphasizes 
on faster query processing, deeper levels of decentralism, and methods to protect against 
copyright law violation.  
SARP Net is a secure, anonymous, decentralized, P2P overlay network that is designed to 
protect the activity of its users in its own file-sharing community. It is secure in the fact that 
public-key encryption is used to guard eavesdroppers during messages. The protocol guarantees 
user anonymity by incorporating message hopping from node to node to prevent any network 
observer from pinpointing the origin of any file query or shared-file source. To further enhance 
the system’s security, a reputation scheme is incorporated to police nodes from malicious 
activity, maintain the overlay’s topology, and enforce rules to protect node identity.   
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
Since the advent of Napster, the idea of peer-to-peer (P2P) architectures being applied to 
file-sharing applications has become popular, spawning other commercial peer-to-peers like 
Gnutella, Grokster, Morpheus, Kazaa, eDonkey, and BitTorrent. This growth in P2P 
development has nearly eradicated the idea of the traditional client-server structure in the file 
sharing model, placing emphasizes on distributed and faster query processing, deeper levels of 
decentralism, and methods to protect user identities to avoid copy-right violation prosecution. 
The gain in popularity of the P2P paradigm has attracted all walks of life to attempt to 
benefit from the potential power of any P2P system. In many cases, P2P networks provide users 
with a collection of computer resources to exploit and use for personal benefit. In a P2P network 
designed to distribute workload to multiple computers, the workload can be accomplished faster 
and less resource-expensive than using a single computer or a multiprocessor machine. The most 
well-known example of this is the SETI@Home project that distributes mathematical 
calculations to its peers for research [30].  
Security-wise, P2P systems run the risk of exposing their users to several security threats. 
Common attacks and malicious activities performed on nodes include distributed denial-of-
service (DDOS) attacks, poisoning attacks, IP harvesting, flooding, data relay refusal, malware 
distribution, and leeching (nodes refusing to share data but are willing to query and download 
data) [32]. These threats run the risk of seriously compromising networks, damaging a system’s 
safety credibility, and spreading malicious content such as viruses and worms. 
 SARP Net, the proposed model, is the structure of a completely decentralized file-
sharing system that incorporates heavy security mechanisms while supporting efficient queries, 
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fault tolerance, and other features desired by typical file-sharing applications. Its main goal is to 
help maintain a high level of security for its users while protecting their identities through 
message hopping. 
The main contributions of this work include the model’s reputation scheme and the 
system’s open design. The reputation scheme described in this work builds off of the idea that 
friend-to-friend networks help establish an automatic web-of-trust that can be utilized to filter 
out malicious nodes. The system’s robust open design allows many areas of the protocol and 
node functionality to be extended to support a large number of different distributed computing 
features. This takes away the limitation that this system is only designed for file-sharing. The 
system can easily be customized to help distribute streaming multimedia, web browsing, file 
storage, document publication, and malware alerts. 
SARP Net is described in detail in the following chapters. First, a background about P2P 
systems is provided, followed by a survey of the most prevalent P2P security issues and related 
work. Finally, SARP Net is discussed, accompanied with the experiments, results, conclusion, 
and future work. 
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CHAPTER TWO: BACKGROUND 
Since the advent of Napster in 1999, Peer-to-Peer (P2P) technology has received 
overwhelming levels of interest [16]. This spark in attention has influenced a technological 
revolution from centralized servers dominating socket-connected systems to the use of a 
decentralized flow of information. P2P protocols are now being employed in many different 
facets of information sharing across the internet-medium. Such uses include file sharing, instant 
messaging systems, streaming multimedia, and distributed computing. 
The definitive quality that any “true” P2P system possesses is the absence of a centralized 
server [9]. All nodes in a true P2P network have the ability to portray any role and possess any 
privilege the network offers. Typically, in the client-server model, servers and hosts have higher 
privileges than the clients they serve. In the place of this centralized host, decentralized networks 
have intricate architectures of computers that relay data among each other. Since the main 
interest of any P2P network is to distribute data and workload in an efficient manner, most of the 
major innovations in P2P file-sharing design have focused on file distribution speed and query 
performance.  
The following sections provide an understanding of the different types of P2P networks, 
their strengths and weaknesses, centralized versus decentralized P2P networks, and potential P2P 
problems and solutions.  
2.1 Centralized Servers: 
By definition, a centralized network is a system that possesses a centralized server who 
relays all queries and responses to other entities in the system. These main hosts and servers are 
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given the highest level of privilege and ultimately controls all interactions between computers 
connected to the network [20]. This structure is most commonly known as a client-server 
architecture where clients are the computers who make queries, requests, and file transfers in the 
system. Servers are the host computers who accept these queries and requests from clients and 
relay the data to other nodes. Figure 1 depicts how in a small and simple client-server network 
one server could be responsible for all requests from its clients. 
The client-server architecture tends to be the most basic design of internet 
communication between two or more computers where clients are initializing and executing 
messages and servers are relaying them. This holds true in the realm of P2P networking. In the 
case of file-sharing P2P networking, a centralized server accepts all client connections and relays 
commands initializing file searches, file transfers, chat messages, and other network requests to 
all or a subset of connected clients. 
 
Figure 1: Client-Sever Architecture 
Napster is the most well-known centralized file-sharing network to date. Even though its 
architecture has a few complex components and has been modified over the years, the original 
1999 Napster uses all of the basics of a centralized P2P system. 
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Each Napster client connects to multiple servers through a single session on the network. 
When a client attempts to log into the Napster network, the client first connects to a main server. 
This main server accepts or rejects a client’s personal information, including a username, 
password, email address, and the number of files that the client will share. If the client was 
accepted, a directory server receives a listing of all the files the client will share. The directory 
server handles all queries for file searches. When the client wishes to perform a file search the 
client would sends a message with the search criteria to the directory server and wait for a 
response. If the server has a listing of that file in its shared files look-up table, it will reply with 
the file’s basic information such as the file’s source, file name, and file size. To download a file 
the client establishes a connection to the file source who is already listening to a designated port. 
Next, the requesting node notifies the file source of which file is to be transferred, and depending 
if authorization is granted, the file will then be transmitted through that connection. More 
detailed information can be found at [2] or [3] about Napster. 
The rate at which a query result is returned to a client is extremely fast in centralized 
networks in comparison to other designs. In Napster’s case, since the directory server has a 
listing of all files and host addresses, only one computer has to execute a search. Other many 
other centralized designs distribute the search workload at the cost of forwarding query 
messages. Here, once a server receives a query message, it will relay the message to a subset of 
its clients where each recipient will search for the file on its own and send the results of the 
query back to the server. The server will then gather all of the results and relay them back to the 
requesting client. Even though this is not as fast as Napster’s implementation, this method saves 
the centralized server from performing a lot of searches and requiring clients to upload their 
shared file listings at the cost of relaying query messages. 
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The centralized genre of P2P architecture comes with a couple of noteworthy problems. 
The first is the need for fast, reliable servers. These servers have to possess enough bandwidth 
and resources to handle a magnitude of incoming and outgoing data at once. The major 
disadvantage of centralized P2P networks is its dependency on a small number of computers. If a 
server goes down due to power failure, security breaches, or network activity overload, the entire 
system can halt and connections will be dropped. With this flaw, centralized systems suffer from 
a lack of fault tolerance.  
2.2 Decentralized Servers: 
A decentralized network is a system that distributes the hosting responsibilities among 
other computers [4]. This absence of critical central servers creates a need for a scheme to handle 
all connections and queries in a way that does not place a large workload on any single network 
entity yet guaranteeing a sense of operational reliability. Figure 2 displays a decentralized 
formation, where clients share responsibilities in order to process network data, make requests, 
and maintain the topology it the network. Notice the lack of a central host. 
 
Figure 2: Decentralized P2P Architecture 
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In a decentralized design, several issues arise when developing a working scheme. The 
biggest issue is to assign incoming connections to already-connected peers. This requires a 
connection between an incoming client and a server before the client can connect to other peers. 
In the connection, the server will assign the client one or more addresses to connect to in order to 
join the network. Typically, this assignment will initiate a connection to other peers or one of 
many servers in the already established system. The problem that this bootstrap server causes is 
that it automatically forces any decentralized system to have a centralized point since all clients 
must primarily connect to a single server whose address never changes and is known by all 
clients. The compromise this issue has spawned deals with logic: since nodes that are new to the 
network must receive information about who to connect to, nodes must know at least one other 
computer to connect to. Without some sort of bootstrapping information, a node can never join 
the system so a bootstrap server is needed.  
Other concerns with a decentralized architecture are their handling of security and 
reliability issues. Since all decentralized networks have either multiple peer-servers or force 
queries to go through several chains of peers, message interception and system vulnerabilities 
can easily be exploited. Messages being relayed from one peer to another can always be captured 
by intermediate connections. Even though most P2P networks pass encrypted messages between 
peers this security technique combats threats from attacks outside of the system. Meaning that 
messages containing query information must be decrypted and known by all reached clients, 
malicious intermediate peers can easily extract file search strings, query results, and IP addresses 
of the requesting client and peers who satisfy the requests if a protection system is not 
implemented. 
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Typically, decentralized systems perform queries slower than its centralized counterpart. 
In truly decentralized systems, query messages must traverse a web of peers before propagating 
back to the requesting client. In comparison to a centralized design, where one message is sent to 
a single server and the server sends the result back to the requesting computer, it is easy to see 
how the speed differs between the two different schemes [4]. When multiple peer-servers are 
used in a decentralized system, the query speed can be similar to Napster’s centralized design if 
each peer-server acts in the same manner as Napster’s directory server. 
2.3 Popular File-Sharing P2Ps: 
There are many different techniques to design a decentralized system. Some of the most 
innovative implementations have been designed by commercial institutions which have spawned 
P2P file sharing applications such as Gnutella, Morpheus, KaZaa, BitTorrent, and E-Mule to 
name a few. Each system provides a unique design of a file-sharing network with features that 
focus on query and file transfer speed. 
2.3.1 Gnutella: 
The Gnutella protocol is among the most popular P2P designs to date. It was the first 
mainstream file-sharing protocol to use a decentralized server in 2000. The first two generations 
of the Gnutella network have influenced the P2P file-sharing community immensely. From 2000 
to 2002 the first generation (Gnutella versions 0.1-0.6) was heavily decentralized and seemed to 
be the best implementation of a “true” P2P system with the existence of bootstrap servers. In 
2002, Gnutella 2 was developed. This second generation recognized the main problems faced in 
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the first Gnutella versions and sought to correct them by stepping away from decentralization in 
its design to handle peer connections. Both generations will now be discussed, describing the 
three main issues both architectures addresses: how peers connect to the network, how 
disconnections are handled, and how queries are performed. Complete descriptions of Gnutella 
can be found at [12] and [31]. 
The best way to describe the first generation of Gnutella is as a complex network of peers 
who pass messages to each other without an intermediary. The creators of Gnutella gave each 
peer the title of “servent” which denotes a merger between the typical network roles of server 
and client. This means that each Gnutella node acts as both a client and server to other peers, 
handling message relays and query operations. 
When a client wants to join the Gnutella network, the client must obtain a list of already 
connected servents. This list can be acquired by connecting to a bootstrap server whose sole 
purpose is to collect IP addresses of servents and relay all or a subset of them to connecting 
computers. Once a computer has a list of servents, it will attempt to connect to a subset of them. 
Any servents addresses that are not accepting connections will be discarded. 
Queries are handled in a web based manner for this version of Gnutella. To initialize a 
file query, a servent will send a query message to all of the servents it is connected to. This query 
message will contain the query command tag, the text string to search for, the IP address of the 
requesting servent, and the search depth. Each servent will perform the query and forward the 
message to the other servents it is connected to. This step is repeated until the search depth has 
been reached. If one of the servents has the requested file then it will send a message with the file 
information directly to requesting servent by establishing a connection if one does not already 
exist. If the requesting servent wants to download a file specified in the query results then a 
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direct connection is established between one or more hosts. When multiple hosts are used 
“swarming” is perform. Swarming is a technique which breaks down a target file into fragments 
and several hosts upload different fragments to the requesting servent. When all of the fragments 
have been transferred, the downloading computer combines each fragment into a single file and 
validates it. Validation takes place on two occasions: before any file transfers take place when 
several hosts are used to transfer one file and when the transfer is complete. Hash functions are 
used in this form of validation by comparing hash values on each file host that is used for a 
transfer and then to compare the transmitted file with the one from the source. 
With the use of a bootstrap server to distribute servents lists, Gnutella seems to have a 
centralized server. On the contrary, this bootstrap server can easily be removed without 
jeopardizing the connectivity of the network’s active nodes since its protocol allows for users to 
specify which servents to connect to. Therefore, as long as there are at least two servents 
connected, a Gnutella network will exist. This takes away the dependency on a single computer 
to always be connected like Napster and other centralized networks. 
The main drawback to the Gnutella network is the speed for queries. Propagation of the 
network can take large amounts of time for a single query to reach the specified search depth of 
the system. Furthermore, the direct connections that are created from these queries take 
additional time and slow the rate for a query result to be returned. To handle this rate issue 
Gnutella 2 was created in 2002. Going on the fact that centralized servers tend to perform queries 
more efficiently than their decentralized cousins, the developers of Gnutella 2 incorporated a 
design with qualities from both architecture.  
Gnutella 2 breaks away from the use of servents and separates peers by assigning “leaf” 
and “hub” roles. Leaves are peers who initiate connections to one or two hubs at any given time. 
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A hub is a peer who accepts large amounts of leaf connections, collect file listings from all 
connected leaves, and performs file searches for queries. This method takes away from the 
network congestion the first generation of Gnutella has caused while guaranteeing that any file 
on the network is reachable. Gnutella 2 also incorporates a few notable additions such as data 
compression, the use of UDP, and a file preview function.  
To decrease the bandwidth used for file transfers, the second generation of Gnutella uses 
a compression scheme to attempt to minimize the file size for transmission. With compression, 
faster transfers can take place creating more sources for shared files. Finally, a preview function 
was added to this version of Gnutella. The preview of audio and video allows users to test a file 
before a transfer is complete. File preview combats time wasting by the downloading peer for 
receiving preview-able dummy files. In addition to this, file ratings have been installed which 
allow users to comment on a transferred file. Ratings help notify future downloading nodes if a 
file is corrupt, malware, poor quality, etc. New updates are constantly being made to the Gnutella 
network to improve performance and security. These two early generations provided a 
foundation for decentralized file-sharing. 
2.3.2 KaZaa and FastTrack: 
 KaZaa is another P2P file sharing network that became popular with the downfall of 
Napster. The KaZaa software uses the FastTrack file-sharing protocol to connect thousands of 
computers to its single network. The FastTrack architecture can be seen as an extension to the 
Gnutella protocol since it takes Gnutella’s basics fundamentals and produces a product whose 
design is very similar to Gnutella 2. 
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 Instead of labeling peers as Gnutella’s “hubs” and “leaves”, FastTrack assigns “node” 
and “supernode” roles to its incoming connections [4]. In much respects, supernodes perform the 
same tasks as hubs and the same goes for nodes and leaves. Throughout the KaZaa network there 
are many supernodes who each accept many connections from nodes. A computer connecting to 
the network is given supernode status if and only if it is a fast computer with excellent bandwidth 
and a fast connection. This selected few handles message passing between nodes which include 
chat messages, query requests, and other network commands. 
 Each KaZaa application comes with a list of supernodes pre-installed. When a computer 
wishes to join the network it will go through the list until a connection can be made to a 
supernode. The incoming computer will then be given a list of supernodes to be used the next 
time the computer wishes to enter the network and to select which supernode the incoming 
computer wishes to use as its designated supernode for the current session.  Once a supernode is 
chosen, a connection is made and the incoming node will transmit a list of files it will share. If 
the incoming computer is a supernode then it will connect to several other supernodes, broadcast 
its supernode status, and await nodes to establish a connection to it. 
 When a user initiates a file search query, a message containing the search string is sent to 
a supernode. The supernode will search through its listing of all files shared by the nodes it 
oversees and reply with any matches. The supernode will also forward the query message to 
other supernodes to broaden the search. When a file is located, a direct connection to the node 
who initiated the query is established if one does not already exist. Once the connection is made, 
the file information and the IP address of the file host are sent to the query author. When the 
query author wants to download a file, a direct connection is made between it and the file hosts, 
resulting in the file being fragmented among hosts and transmitted. 
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 One interesting addition KaZaa brought to the file-sharing development community is the 
use of “participation level”. The amount of bytes uploaded by a peer determines how many query 
results will be returned to it and the downloading priority level it will possess. The use of the 
participation level was implemented to thwart peers from only downloading and never sharing 
(uploading) any files on the network. 
2.3.2 BitTorrent:  
BitTorrent [6] can be classified as thousands of directly connected node groups, each 
sharing short-lived and sharing commonly interested files. In the most basic of BitTorrent 
implementations, there is an absence of a centralized server to initialize connections or to process 
queries. To handle file requests, a .torrent file is used which contains the IP address of the file’s 
tracker server and information about the targeted file. File information would include the file 
name, file offset and length, and hashes for each portion of the fragmented file. The tracker 
server is a computer who maintains a list of other computers who posses some percentage of the 
requesting file. When the requesting computer connects to the tracker, the list of uploaders will 
be transmitted along with which portions they have. A connection is made to all or a subset of 
the uploaders and specified blocks are transmitted to the requesting computer. The tracker is 
constantly updated with the state of sharing nodes and which file fragments they share. 
To initiate any BitTorrent file transfer, the .torrent file must be located. Torrent files can 
be placed on websites, bulletin boards, newsgroups, etc to point potential downloaders to where 
that the file is available. This .torrent file is created when a user wishes to share a file. It acts like 
an announcement that the file is available. Once a user downloads a .torrent file and opens it in a 
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BitTorrent client application, it will connect to the tracker specified and begin the process of 
locating uploaders to begin the download. All users are given the option of running their own 
tracker server to their shared files. This makes BitTorrent act as a large number of small file-
sharing networks.  
The most interesting feature of BitTorrent is its method for increasing the availability of a 
file. When a user has downloaded a portion of a file, immediately that portion can be shared to 
other users. This increases the number of hosts and speed of transfers since files are being 
downloaded from several sources. To guarantee that correct blocks are being transferred, the 
hash values from the shared file are used to compare the portions to be transmitted. If the hash 
values are not the same, a transfer will not occur, saving the downloader the time of downloading 
a corrupt or wrong block and an uploader from having to waste bandwidth. 
Another key feature BitTorrent has is its ability to not clog the network when a rare file is 
being requested by a lot of users. When a bottleneck forms in a P2P system, a lot of strain can be 
placed on a single sharer. BitTorrent handles this problem by uploading different blocks of a file 
to different users when a file is rare. When several blocks are spread out among users, requesting 
users can download missing blocks from other users, not burdening one computer with many 
requests. This scheme, with the addition of downloading blocks out of order, speeds up file 
transfers of rare files which seems to be a problem with other P2P systems. 
The advantage for Bit Torrent is its handling of rare files and its use of swarming. Also, 
the protocol uses a participation monitor that depends on how much a user has uploaded. If there 
are multiple users requesting a file, priority will be given to those who have higher participation 
levels, resulting in slow downloads for those who do not share. 
15 
2.4 Classification Summary: 
In short, the most influential P2P protocols all differ in one significant way or another. 
Napster was a centralized file-sharing system who supported fast queries but lacked the notion of 
using several hosts to download a single file and fault tolerance. The first generation of Gnutella 
created a unique way of connecting thousands of computers without the need of a centralized 
server and implemented one of the first mainstream uses of swarming. Gnutella 2 was an 
evolution of the first generation that went toward a more centralized approach by introducing the 
assignment of hub and leaf roles to its peers but produced faster query results than its 
predecessor. KaZaa has many similarities to Gnutella 2. Using the FastTrack protocol, Kazaa 
does not need a centralized server due to its dependence on supernode listings to always be 
updated. BitTorrent is a protocol that differs immensely from the other P2P systems mentioned. 
Instead of creating one massive network of peers, BitTorrent thrives on the creation of .torrent 
files to create very small computer groups where all connected users share an interest in the same 
file. BitTorrent’s handling of rare files is unlike other file-sharing schemes due to its handling of 
scarce fragments. 
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CHAPTER THREE: COMMON P2P SECURITY ISSUES 
With the popularity of many commercial P2P file sharing applications, such as Napster 
and Kazaa, security has become an aspect of P2P development that has begun to receive a lot of 
attention. Until recently, security has not been a main focus for many P2P development schemes. 
Alternatively, query speed and fault tolerance approaches monopolized system design in hopes 
to be a beneficial tradeoff from secure systems. With in the last few years, P2P schemes, such as 
Indra [13] have placed major emphasis on security for distributed environments. In this section, 
the major security issues P2P systems face will be discussed. 
3.1 Validity of Queried Files: 
 One security feature file sharing systems must incorporate is a strong mechanism to allow 
users to verify the files to be downloaded are the intended files from their initial query. The need 
for this feature is that most of the popular file-sharing applications suffer from dummy files 
being introduced to their shared file libraries. These dummy files are files malicious users share 
on the network in hopes of tricking an unsuspecting user to download them. At first glance, these 
files seem to be the exact files querying users are looking for since they may have file lengths 
that seem appropriate, IDE tags that match queried music or movie information, or in the most 
basic of cases, have what seems to be a valid file name. Once a dummy file transfer is complete 
and the user realizes the file is not the desired one, time, bandwidth, and possibly money is 
wasted. 
 Several preexisting file sharing programs use file previewing to combat this issue. 
Software like LimeWire and Morpheus allow their users to preview partially downloaded files 
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during the file transfer. For example, if an mp3 file is being downloaded and 1 megabyte (MB) 
of the total 3 MB has been transferred, the user can preview the 1MB of audio to determine if the 
transfer should continue or to kill the download. Although beneficial for downloaders, this 
approach does not remedy the problem of dummy, corrupt, or undesired file transfers entirely. 
One problem with this form of previewing approach is that some file formats, such as DivX 
video [7], cannot be previewed until the entire file has been downloaded. In many cases, large 
portions of the file must be downloaded in order to preview. By the time a user is able to use the 
preview function, large amounts of time has passed and large amounts of data have been 
transferred. A second problem occurs when dummy files contain looped versions of the queried 
audio or video. The problem here lies when the user previews the transferred portion of the file 
and does not detect the loop. The file could continue to be allowed to be transferred so when the 
download is complete, the user is left with a dummy file. Once again, time and bandwidth, 
among other things, are wasted. 
 Other existing solutions to dummy files are the employment of peer and file reviews. 
Peer reviews allow users of P2P systems to rate each other on the quality of the files they share 
and transfer. Once a file has been transferred, the downloader can evaluate the newly acquired 
file and write a review (normally a rating 1-5) about the uploader and send it to the host or 
servent computer for storage. A similar manner was used for file reviews, where the reviews of 
the files were sent to the hosts and also stored on the downloader’s computer. These 
rating/review systems allowed users to use the opinions of others before downloading a file by 
retrieving reviews when query results are returned, making these P2P systems integrity based.  
 A few problems arise from this solution. The first problem is the mandatory storage of 
addition information. Each review must be stored on some computer for easy retrieval. If the 
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hosts involved were Gnutella servents and could disconnect from the system at any point, backup 
methods would have to be employed to guarantee the reviews and ratings were long-lived. A 
second problem is that these reviews and ratings were more data being returned during queries. 
This ultimately would slow down query results from being returned to the users, hurting one of 
the most important goals of any P2P file system (fast query results). In addition, these integrity 
based systems must deal with malicious users. This opens the risk of users returning false ratings 
or biased reviews in hopes of discrediting or promoting a user or a file. 
3.2 Verifying Transferred Files: 
 Another security issue that file sharing systems must handle is to verify that a 
downloaded file is an exact copy of the file selected to download from the initial query results. 
One cause of this problem is the ability of uploaders to modify the file contents of files to be 
uploaded while the files are being transferred. This problem occurs when file sharing programs 
allow users to pause or temporarily suspend transfers.  
One solution is to use hash values of files before and after every file transfer. A hash 
function, using the files to be transferred as input, is used to generate these hash values. Once a 
file has been transferred, the downloader can take the hash value of the downloaded file and 
compare it to the hash value of the file stored on the uploader’s computer. One common issue 
with file verification using hash values is when transfer pausing is allowed. Here, the uploader 
must send the hash value of file content that was transmitted to the downloader for verification. 
If the hash values differ, then the downloader should reject that uploader as a host. 
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A second use of hash functions in file sharing applications is when a user can download a 
single file from multiple sources. In this use, hash values of returned files from queries can be 
compared to determine if multiple sources of the same file exist.  
Cryptographic hash functions, like the MD5 algorithm, with a 128-bit hash value, are 
widely used for file verification [21]. The popular P2P application eDonkey uses the MD4 
algorithm in its early versions to verify file partitions[15].  
3.3 Malicious Users: 
The very real possibility of individuals and groups of individuals attempting to harm a 
P2P system poses a real threat to the health, existence, and security of any P2P community as 
evident in [28]. Since the very base of P2P per networks are their peers, attacks can originate 
from anywhere within the network. Attack motives include but are not limited to clogging the 
system, obtaining IP lists of users, using the systems resources, spread spam messages, and infect 
users with worms, viruses, trojans, spyware, and other forms of malware [27]. 
 One method previously discussed involved poisoning attacks, which are when malicious 
users share dummy files which differ from their descriptions [22]. This attack’s main purpose is 
to dupe users into wasting time and bandwidth. More sinister poisoning attacks include dummy 
files with malware. With the spread of viruses in a file sharing system, sections of a P2P network 
can easily be disabled from attack, resulting in computer damage at individual nodes, 
unavailability of rare or precious files, and in systems with the group hierarchies, difficulty for 
groups to thrive [27].  
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 Current solutions to malware attacks involve the users making file reviews, scanning files 
with anti-virus software, and using intrusion detection systems (IDS) such as NetBiotic [27] to 
detect malicious activity. Schemes like NetBiotic allow malware to be detected at local levels 
and then broadcast alerts other connected computers about the threat. Depending on the severity 
of the threat, IDS’s can choose what actions need to take place in order to neutralize the attack. 
Other IDSs will be discussed later to handle other forms of attacks. 
 Two other attacks P2P systems must be prepared for are Denial of Service (DOS) and 
Distributed Denial of Service (DDOS) attacks [27]. DOS attacks are when malicious users send 
large number of packets of data to a computer with the intent to slow the computer down, or in 
extreme cases, knock the victim computer offline [28]. In coordinated attacks, DDOS attacks 
involve multiple computers attacking a computer system. In P2P systems, servents-like nodes or 
hosts are the more vulnerable computers to these attacks. If a host is victim to a DOS or DDOS 
attack, all of its connected users can suffer from slow query responses, not be able to query the 
adequate portions of the network, and may lose the ability to connect to peers outside of its group 
or neighbors. If a host is disconnected from a DOS attack, all of its clients must connect to 
another host to interact with the system. The coordination of DDOS attacks does not require all 
of the attackers to be malicious. A prime example of this involves DDOS originated by one 
computer that trick non-malicious users into sending a targeted computer data or requests for 
data by falsifying query results [32]. 
 An attack related to DOS attacks is flooding. Flooding is an attack that consists of 
malicious users who are connected to the system sending large amounts of queries and other 
system commands throughout the network. In many cases, theses attacks send a flood of 
messages to a node with the intention to do the same damage as a typical DOS attack. In some 
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regards, flooding can cause more problems than DOS attacks, depending on the architecture of 
the network. For example, if queries are forwarded from servent to servent, as in Gnutella, each 
visited servent can see the same attack as the original servent. To combat this possible 
vulnerability, checks must be made to guarantee that each node is not allowed to send a large 
enough amount of commands, queries, or data in a given time to potentially harm the system. 
Also, during direct connections, peer applications should also limit the amount of 
communication being transmitted between peers for a given interval as an extra precaution.  
 IP harvesting is another security threat that must be attended to for P2P systems. IP 
harvesting is the gathering of user IP addresses with the intent to either perform some form of 
computer attack or to use the address to trace the personal identity of peer [32]. With an IP 
address, a users’ name, phone number, and address can be obtained if divulged by an ISP. This 
information can be obtained by groups like the Recording Industry Association of America 
(RIAA) and Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) with court orders or the threat of 
suing an ISP’s over copyright violations. These groups constantly search file sharing networks 
for copyright law violators and in many cases, take legal action. In order to guarantee user 
privacy, protocols like Friend-to-Friend (F2F) and anonymous P2P systems have been created. 
F2F systems are P2P networks that base connections on trusted peers and strong levels of 
encryption. Here, peers who know each other (“friends”) can only share communication and data 
with each other, friends of friends, friends of friends of friends, etc. Users of F2F networks can 
only share data with people in a web-of-trust, where every member can be traced to a direct 
friend. The most popular of F2F systems is WASTE, which was developed at NULLSOFT in 
2003 by Justin Frankel [29]. 
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Anonymous P2P protocols attempt to hide node identities behind a cloud of deniability 
[5]. This way, it is difficult to locate the original source of any request on the system. There are 
several anonymous P2P protocols in existence; among the most popular are Freenet [5] and the 
BitTorrent client Azureus [1]. 
3.4 Intrusion Detection: 
 In P2P systems, the act of intrusion can occur in a lot of different places. Two of most 
important areas of intrusion are at the network level and at system privileges. At the network 
level, intrusion is present when unauthorized persons attempt to gain access to the system [13]. 
This includes being able to connect to peers, make queries, and perform other system features 
authorize peers are capable to perform. An example would be of malicious users attempting to  
gain access to a password protected system with authorization. In P2P systems that allow users to 
set privileges on network items, such as files, groups, bandwidth speeds, and peer-
communication, potential intrusion needs to be anticipated.  
The occurrence of users that successfully access features that they do not have authorized 
privileges for is a major security problem since it threatens confidentiality of peers and reliability 
of the system. The need of intrusion detection mechanisms is essential for any secure P2P 
system. Many existing intrusion detection and prevention schemes, like Indra [13], target passive 
and aggressive attacks that try to break in or disrupt a network. Such schemes attempt to 
recognize common areas of attack, such as port scanning, multiple failed logins, and possible 
DOS and DDOS attacks. Similar to how NetBiotic  [27] forwards warning messages from nodes 
that were victims of attack to other nodes on the network, “neighborhood watch” and P2P 
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communication has become a good mechanism for detecting intrusion attempts and preventing 
the spread [13]. 
Sybil attacks are a security issue that many P2P networks must address. Sybil attacks 
mostly target the reputation systems of networks that employ such a scheme by attempting to 
make them meaningless. This form of attack occurs when users are permitted to create multiple 
identities on a network. With these multiple identities, users can perform malicious tasks on 
some of their identities and behave correctly on others. This allows malicious users to always 
have access to the privileges that well behaved nodes have and disrupt the network at the same 
time [8]. As one can imagine, this is a problem for reputation schemes attempting to punish 
malicious nodes and phrase behaving ones. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: RELATED WORK 
Indra [13] is an intrusion detection and prevention scheme that is based on the P2P 
architecture. It is powerful in the fact that once there is an attack at a single node level, messages 
are sent out through the network, notifying other nodes of the attack. The protection starts with 
each host on the network running the Indra daemon. The daemon watches for common intrusion 
attempts and ones based on previous attempts. Since hosts rely on the validity of security 
messages, a Web of Trust is used, where all nodes are connected by trust relationships. This 
assists in preventing nodes from reporting false intrusion attempts and disrupting the system. In 
addition, efficient group communication is essential for the distribution of intrusion information. 
The efficient group communication helps guarantee that messages are sent and received. The 
basic architecture of Indra depends on four separate roles: Watchers, Access Controllers, 
Listeners, and Reporters. Watchers look for suspicious activity, either locally or over the 
network. Access Controllers provide controlled access to the resources. Listeners listen to the 
watchers and transmit warnings to the Access Controllers. Reporters communicate with other 
hosts by receiving and forwarding warnings on intrusion attempts. A few of the common 
intrusion threats Indra monitors for include multiple failed logins, port scan attempts, and 
suspicious system calls [13]. 
Vlachos et al’s NetBiotic [27] is an application that uses a collection of several computers 
in a group of peers to exchange messages with information about attacks. The difference 
between NetBiotic and Indra is that the former takes into account more local attacks, such as 
viruses, and determines how to handle to threat across the network. The NetBiotic application 
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has two roles: Notifiers and Handlers. Notifiers are daemons responsible for monitoring the local 
node on which it is running to gather information on possible security attacks. This daemon 
monitors security applications like firewalls, anti-virus software, and IDS’s for suspicious events. 
Handlers are the NetBiotic daemon that receives messages sent from the Notifiers of other nodes 
and performs actions based on those messages to protect that node and the network [27]. 
 Another category of secure P2P systems attempt to guarantee the anonymity of all users 
at the cost of increased bandwidth and query speeds. One such system is Freenet [5]. Freenet is 
decentralized data store which heavily relies on its key-based routing system to protect queries 
and file retrieval. In essence, Freenet is a network of nodes communicating with one another 
through the use of encrypted messages. In this system, no broadcast searches or centralized 
servers every have to be used to relay data. Similar to the Gnutella protocol, Freenet nodes 
connect to several other nodes running the Freenet protocol to establish a network of neighbors. 
When a node wishes to query for a file, encrypted messages, containing the key of the target file, 
are passed from neighbor to neighbor. When a neighbor receives a query command, it will search 
its local data store to detect if portions of the file are stored locally or if the location is known on 
the network, and return the results to the neighbor who passed the query message. If the location 
is unknown at an individual node level, the query message is passed to the neighbors of the 
current node. If the file location is not known after reaching a predefined search depth, messages 
are returned in reverse order, notifying neighbors a search branch has not located the file. The 
use of relaying messages from node to node guarantees the anonymity of the query author. The 
guarantee is made since nodes can always claim to be relaying another node’s query. To further 
guarantee the anonymity of users, especially producers and consumers of the files being shared, 
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Freenet encrypts and fragments shared files, to distribute the content across the network. The 
distribution of encrypted file fragments prevent nodes from knowing what files they are sharing 
but the key-based routing system allows querying nodes to locate desired files. The goal here is 
that even if a consumer knows the identity of the producer, the producer cannot be held 
accountable for the file transmission since it cannot have any idea of what file it is sharing. 
Another anonymous P2P system is GNUnet [11]. Similar to Freenet, it also is decentralized and 
claims to be censorship-resistant. 
 Another genre of secure P2P networks uses the Friend-to-Friend (F2F) approach to 
protect users. The main idea of F2F networks is that nodes only connect to nodes either they can 
trust or to nodes a friend of someone in a friend-of-a-friend web can trust. Basically, files are 
only shared and queries are only made within a web-of-trust where each node can be traced to 
another node through friends associations. There are two major disadvantages arise in F2F 
networks. One, the existence of malicious friendly nodes can completely disrupt a F2F network. 
Two, files outside of the friend web are unreachable. The most well known F2F network is 
WASTE [29]. 
27 
CHAPTER FIVE: SARP NET 
 SARP Net is a P2P overlay network that is designed to protect the activity of its users. It 
is secure in the fact that public-key encryption is used to guard network messages from prying 
eyes internal and external of the network. The protocol guarantees user anonymity by 
incorporating message-hopping from node to node to prevent any network observer from 
pinpointing the origin of any query or shared-file source. To further enhance the system’s 
security, a reputation scheme is incorporated to police nodes from malicious activity, maintain 
the overlay’s topology, and enforce rules to protect node identity. The following sections 
describe in detail the design of SARP Net. 
5.1 Topology:  
SARP Net is based on a three tier hierarchy where each level denotes a unique role to the 
system. Each role is used to maintain the formation of node groups to process queries, file 
transfers, and distribute reputations. 
5.1.1 Node Roles: 
User-node: The bottom tier is comprised of user-nodes. User-nodes are the most basic type of 
node in the topology, being the most common role throughout the network. This type of user has 
the privileges making, responding to and forwarding queries, query and return interaction 
receipts, transfer files, and post reputations based on interactions of other connected nodes. User-
nodes cannot establish connections to other nodes outside of their group for any reason than to 
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process file transfers. Connections to all or a subset of nodes within the same group are permitted 
to exchange messages directly. Even though the user-node role is the lowest leveled, user-nodes 
are the driving force of each group since they produce the most queries, query responses, file 
transfers, and reputations. 
 
Group-Leaders: The middle tiered role is that of group-leaders. Group-leaders represent the 
current hosts for a group of which user-nodes connect to in order to join the network. In effect, 
group-leaders connect each group member to other groups by establishing links to leader-of-
leader nodes. Nodes of this role govern the group by monitoring the activities of their user-nodes 
by making judgment based on reputation and alert messages from nodes internal and external to 
the group. If a user-node is determined to be malicious, the set of group-leaders have the 
privilege of isolating a node from the group or restrict the node’s privileges to make the group 
safe. Group-leaders divide their resources (bandwidth and processing power) between providing 
the services user-nodes offer, forwarding interaction receipts, resolving interaction disputes, 
validating incoming users, and maintaining the formation of the group. A user-node has the 
opportunity to be promoted to group-leader if the user-node excels more than the other user-
nodes when an appointment of a new group-leader is needed. Role promotion and demotion will 
be discussed later. 
 
Group: A group is not a role a node can obtain but can be seen as a virtual container for user-
nodes and group-nodes who are connected by references and associations. Each group is made 
up of a number of user-nodes and a fraction of as many group-leaders to govern them. The 
number of group-leaders is proportional to the number of user-nodes currently online. For 
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example, a group rule can be set for every 10 user-nodes one group-leader is assigned. Group-
leaders of a group are interconnected to allow free flowing messages to be exchanged. Group-
leaders of a group must share the same group-state and update other group-leaders if a state is 
altered. The establishment of groups allows subsets of nodes in the network to be governed: 
punishing malicious nodes, rewarding benevolent nodes, maintain the livelihood of a group, 
keeping group-members updated, accepting new members from node references, and verifying 
member identity when existing members join the network. 
 
Leader-of-Leader: The top tier of the hierarchy is the leader-of-leader (LL) role. LL’s connect 
groups to other groups by acting as a go-between by forwarding messages from one group’s 
group-leader to a different group’s group-leader. The role of LL has two major jobs: forward 
messages from one group to all of the other connected groups and to punish groups who 
repeatedly allow their malicious user-nodes to hurt the integrity of the system. LL’s act very 
similar to group-leaders except they are responsible for group-leader behavior. The activities of 
LL’s are checked by other LL’s of the same leader-group and group-leaders in their range of 
connection. LL’s are promoted from the group-leaders who have fast connections, display superb 
reputation ratings, and have managed their groups properly. LL’s divide their resources by 
forwarding message between groups and other LL’s and monitoring group behavior.  
 
Leader-Group: Leader-groups differ from groups of user-nodes and group-leaders by being 
comprised of LL’s. Each leader-group has a proportion of LL’s to groups. For example, if there 
is a 10:1 ratio of LL’s to groups of a leader-group of 30 groups, three LL’s will be 
interconnected to manage the groups. Each leader-group is connected to other leader-groups by 
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the connections their LL’s establish. Since it is not feasible for each leader-group to be connected 
to all leader-groups in the network, a leader-group is connected to a subset of other leader-
groups. With this setup, each LL of a leader-group is connected to the same leaders of other 
leader-groups. 
 
Bootstrap Server (optional): A bootstrap server is proposed to act as a reference for nodes that 
do not have another entry point into the network. The bootstrap server maintains information on 
each group and IP addresses and port of online LL’s and group-leaders. When a group is formed, 
its identification is sent to the bootstrap server as well as the group’s public-private key pair. 
This key pair is used to verify that user querying for an IP of a group-leader is an actual member. 
When the query is made, the incoming user must send a message using the group’s private key. 
The bootstrap server will then authenticate the message with the group’s public. If the message is 
valid, the server will transmit the IP and port numbers of the group’s online group-leaders. 
Needless to say, each member of a group must have the group’s key pair in order to join the 
group. Without the key pair, the user cannot access online group-leader information and cannot 
enter the network from that entry point. 
 
To maintain the state of the network, each group-leader and leader-of-leader is required 
to constantly update the bootstrap server with status reports of the system. The status messages 
must include IP addresses and ports of online group-leaders and LL’s, number of connected 
users and their roles. 
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Bootstrap servers have the privilege of pruning the network of malicious nodes and 
reassign roles. For example, if a LL is not taking action on a group who repeatedly is being 
reported malicious, the bootstrap server can tell the surrounding LL’s of the malicious LL to 
either demote or boot the malicious LL from the leader-group. More details about network 
safeguarding are described later. 
 
Figure 3: SARP Net’s Node Roles 
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5.1.2 Group Formation: 
With or without a bootstrap server, the network can allow for the creation of groups. 
When a connected user wishes to establish a group, a group creation request command is sent to 
the closest LL overseeing that section of the network. The command contains the future group’s 
name, the group identification where the creator currently has membership to, the creator’s 
username, and the future group’s public key. The LL will then perform a query to retrieve the 
creator’s group reputation and find out how many groups were created by members of this group 
in the past. If the creator’s group is highly reputable and has a free group creation, then the future 
group’s information will be shared among all of the connected LL’s. When the group’s creator 
wishes to invite a new user to join the group, the new user will be given the group’s private and 
public keys to verify the user belongs to the group. If a bootstrap server is used, the new group’s 
information and public key will be transmitted to the bootstrap server directly from the creator. 
 
When a node wishes to locate fellow group-members through another node, a query can 
be sent containing a group search message encrypted in group’s private key. Eventually a node 
with the group’s public key will receive the message, most likely a LL, and retrieve the location 
of one of the group’s active group leaders. The query will then be replied along the same path to 
the verified incoming group-member. If a group-member joins the network but is the only active 
one, the closest LL will recognize that group-member to be the sole active group leader and will 
redirect any future group inquiries to that active member. 
When a new joins the group or when a group-leader is lost, group-leaders must make 
decisions on who to promote based on reputation, available bandwidth, and processing power. 
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Simple “ping” message can be used to gauge bandwidth and processing power to determine 
which user-node should be promoted. 
Once a new group-leader is assigned, the other group- leaders will update the promoted 
node’s status by transmitting reputations, collected query data, and group status information. In 
addition the group-leader will establish connections to all of the group-members it is responsible 
for. The number of group-leader to user-node coverage is based on the group’s configuration 
where some groups may want all of their group-leaders to be connected to all of the members or 
have each group leader be in charge of a section of the group. Groups that allow group-leaders to 
connect to all group members allow each group-leader to act as a backup where if one group-
leader is busy, another group leader is easily accessible to provide the same service. Also, 
messages can be verified easier with majority voting if repetitive messages are transmitted from 
one group member to all of the group-leaders. Groups that divide the group responsibilities 
decrease the workload placed on each group-leader and allow these nodes to focus serving a 
subset of the group.  
Finally, the new group-leader will connect to the assigned LL’s to allow the group to 
communicate with other groups. Once the new group-leader is updated, that node can be used to 
help the group process network requests and traffic.  
Leader-of-Leaders are assigned in a similar manner as the group-leaders. Based on the 
system configuration, the ratio of LL’s to groups should be adequate enough for each leader-of-
leader to process network messages without creating a bottleneck or slow network performance. 
The performance of LL’s is vital to the health of the system since they provide the link that 
connect groups together and manages the communication between different sections of the 
network. With this reason, LL’s should be the most reliable computers on the network. Keeping 
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in mind that LL’s are still nodes with the capability of becoming malicious, disconnect without 
warning, and suddenly experience poor performance bandwidth or CPU processing, safeguards 
must be incorporated. These provisions should gracefully handle the possibility of several LL’s 
failing at a given time to prevent network paralysis. The most important LL criteria must be that 
the most reputable nodes with the fastest available bandwidth and CPU processing should be 
permitted to occupy the highest tiered role in the system.  
When a group comes online for the first time, a leader-group will be assigned to it. This 
normally means the leader-group that receives the sole group-member will be the leader-group 
that will service it. If a LL disconnects, the LL’s of that leader-group will promote the most 
outstanding group-leader or user-node. By promoting user-nodes to LL’s, group restructuring is 
minimized. On the other hand, promoting group-leaders to LL’s allow for faster node 
comparisons at the cost of forcing the chosen group-leader’s group to restructure to find a 
replacement group-leader. It is vital for each LL of a leader-group to be connected to all of the 
same group leaders and LL’s of other leader-groups. This requirement is for the stability of the 
network and the ability of LL’s to reliably take part in the reputation scheme. 
Leader-groups may be disbanded when the number of groups serviced by a leader-group 
becomes small. In this case, the leader-groups will pass on the responsibility of serving its 
groups to other leader groups. This should increase the number of potential query hits since 
groups are guaranteed to interact with more groups and their members. 
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Figure 4: The SARP Net Topology 
 
5.1.3 Node Limitations:  
To set bounds on the amount of groups the system can have or the amount of 
untrustworthy nodes can join the network there are a number of limitations that are applied to all 
participants in the network. The first limitation is how many people a node can invite to a group. 
This limitation is monitored by the group-leaders but is stored by all of the group-members or on 
the group’s dedicated server that can also act as a key distributor. For example, each group-
member is given 1 invitation after being logged into the system for a total of 50 days, has shared 
or helped forward over 2 gigabytes of data, and has a high enough positive reputation. With this 
invitation, the group member can invite anyone to join the group and give that new member the 
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group’s private key. With this invitation and reference from the group-member, the new member 
can connect to any active node in the system, be redirected to any of the target group’s group-
leaders for username registration and key exchange. Once the invitation has been used, the 
acknowledging group-leader will alert all of the group-leaders in the group who will help notify 
all other group-members that the inviter has used his invitation. If the group has a dedicated 
server established, this message can be sent to the server instead of having to be distributed to all 
group-members 
In order to limit users from flooding the network, several limitations are suggested.  
Firstly, user-nodes should not be allowed to forward more than 2 queries per minute. Each 
group-member should keep a log of all incoming messages dating back to 2 minutes. This log 
will allow nodes to determine if any node is attempting to flood it or the network with queries. If 
flooding is allowed, the entire system can suffer from slow processing and see the same effects 
as DOS attacks. As detailed in the routing protocol, description message forwarding is an 
integral part of the system. These forwarded messages can too act as a method of flooding the 
system. To alleviate this potential threat of nodes attacking the network with a series of 
inauthentic forwarding messages, nodes are expected to process incoming messages on a queue. 
The message queue allows a node to manage messages and delay the forwarding request to 
prevent strain on the node’s resources and the intended destination. Similar to query time 
limiting, a node should not forward a high amount of messages to the same destination for a set 
time. This limitation should be based on a node’s group status and amount of traffic taking place. 
Certainly, the time restraint should not halt the querying process but it should be able to detect if 
a node is attempting to flood the system with messages. 
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5.2 Key Distribution: 
Each node must store and transfer keys to keep the network secure. Several generated 
keys are exchanged to protect from eavesdropping, user impersonation, transfer verification, and 
forwarding receipts.  
Upon group creation, the creator must generate a public-private key pair. The public key 
is shared throughout the network as verification for when a user claims to belong to the group. 
Each group member will sign a verification message in the group’s private key to prove that he 
belongs to the group. A typical interaction would include a node A connecting to a LL B and 
claiming to be a group member of group X. A will send B a time stamped message encrypted in 
the group’s private key. B will look up group X’s public key to decrypt the message. If B can 
successfully decrypt the message, B knows that A belongs to group X. Each node on the network 
must store its group’s public-private key pair. Without the key pair, a group member cannot 
connect and interact with its group. 
All nodes must also contain their group identification key pair. Once a user is accepted as 
group member, it must create the key pair and share its public key with members of the group. 
This public key will be used for identification verification. After proving that the user belongs to 
a group and establishes a connection to a group leader, the user must prove its identity. The 
incoming user will transmit the username he claims to posses and a time stamped message with 
the private key of the username. If the group leader can decrypt the message, the incoming user 
can be accepted as the username provided. The group-member’s public key must be distributed 
to all of the group-members to allow a member to join the active group regardless of which 
group-members are serving as the group-leaders. This key pair provides a method of verifying 
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users without running the risk of malicious users in the group of obtaining a fellow group 
member’s password. 
For each interaction between nodes, data must be encrypted in the source’s private key 
then decrypted by the source’s public key once transmitted by the recipient. Interacting nodes 
have the option of generating a session key that is established and generated once a connection is 
made. Still, messages need to be signed in the source’s private key for interaction receipts. 
To distribute keys, group creators can establish a long-lived server that acts as the 
group’s centralized authority. This key distributor should store public keys for all group-
members and the public-private key pair of the group. If each group establishes a key distributor 
and broadcasts information to contact the server, then key distributors can take the place of the 
typical central authority. The existence of group key distributors will make it easy to recover 
from key compromises, broadcasts of group alerts, and key look-ups.  
5.3 Routing Protocol: 
The routing protocol of this network describes how nodes communicate with one another. 
The passing of messages allow file queries and transfers, reputation look-ups and postings, and 
network status updates to be processed securely throughout the system. 
 
File Queries: File queries attempt to search the network for shared files that satisfy the criteria in 
the query message. For example, if a node searched for “documentation P2P” query hits may 
return information on files that have filenames that contain word “documentation” or “P2P”. 
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Typically, group-leaders and user-nodes should only be allowed to make file queries. This is to 
prevent any slow down and potential bottlenecks at the leader-of-leader level.  
The routing of an initial file query message and a file query message to be forwarded are 
handled in the same manner. If LL’s are given the privilege to start queries, and if a LL starts the 
query, it will send the message to all of the groups it is in charge of by sending the message to 
one of each of the connected group’s group-leaders. The LL will also send the message to all of 
the LL’s it is connected to. If a LL receives a file query from a LL in the same leader group, it 
will search for the file locally and not forward the message to anyone. If a LL receives the query 
from a group-leader, it will forward the message to all other connected groups by sending the 
message to one of each group’s group-leaders, forward the message to the other LL’s in its 
leader-group, and finally send the message to one LL of each of the other leader groups it is 
connected to. LL’s will only forward a query if the hops-to-live (HTL) value is currently greater 
than zero. In SARP Net, HTL is used to maintain the scalability of file queries since it would be 
impractical for file queries to be forced to propagate throughout the entire network, especially if 
the network is large. The HTL value is decremented by 1 when a LL forwards the message. If a 
group leader initializes or receives a file query from a user-node, it will send a message to all of 
the group-members it is responsible for and one of its LL’s. If the group-leader received the file 
query from any of its fellow group-leaders, it will perform the search for the file locally and 
forward the message to the fraction of user-nodes it is responsible for forwarding messages to. 
User-nodes handle file queries differently than the leaders. A user-node who initializes a 
query sends the message to either another user-node in the same group or to one of the group-
leaders based on a set forward probability. If this probability is 50%, the user-node will send the 
message to another user-node 50% of the time; the other 50% of the time the message will be 
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forwarded to a group-leader. When another user-node receives a file query from user-node it 
must forward the message to a third user-node or one of the group-leaders, again based on the 
forward probability. If a user-node received the same query twice from a user-node, it will 
forward the query to a group-leader. 
A potential attack would be for user-nodes to forward a file query from a group-leader to 
other user-nodes so when a user-node receives the forwarded message it will forward it to other 
nodes. This would attempt to slow the system by occupying it with redundant forwards. One 
solution to this is that if a user-node receives 2 messages of the same query, one from the group-
leader and one from a user-node, that user-node knows a user-node in the forward chain is 
misbehaving and should refuse to forward the message again.  
All messages are encrypted in the private key of the source node (node A). Let node B 
represent the file query’s destination. The following messages are the text that is encrypted in the 
source’s private key. Below is the message for a file query being transmitted from A to B: 
EPrA(“FQ” || TS || QID || HTL || FIDA || message) 
The contents encapsulated by EPrA are encrypted in A’s private key. “FQ” is the message 
keyword notifying the destination that this message is a file query. The symbol || represents 
string concatenation. TS is the date and time stamp the query was made. QID is the query 
identification number. This identification is generated by the query source and should be unique 
to all file queries spawned from the source node. HTL is the remaining hops-to-live for the 
query. By default, HTL should be set to a value between 4 and 6, depending on the size of the 
network. If the destination node B is a LL and forwards the message, the forwarded message’s 
HTL should be decremented by 1. FIDA is forward identification number generated by the node 
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that is sending the file query to a destination. This FID should be uniquely generated and should 
be different than the QID. It represents the identification number used by each node to provide 
proof that the node forwarded the message to another node. Valid FID’s should comprise of a 
hash of the username and some number that is unique to all forward messages a node will 
experience during an active session. The label “message” is the file search criteria each user will 
use to find files to satisfy the query. 
 
Query Hits: Once a node receives a file query message, it will search its local machine for a file 
that meets the search’s criteria and if a match is found, a query hit message is generated. Query 
hits traverse the reverse path of the query once returned to a group-leader. Each node uses the 
query table to know who to forward a query hit to in order for the response to reach the query 
author. This query table is a history of all interaction receipts for incoming file queries and is 
stored locally. For example, if a user-node is the source (node A) and a query hit is found at 
another user-node in a different group (node B), B will send the hit message to either its group 
leader or another user-node in the group (based on the forward probability discussed earlier). 
Eventually the group-leader will receive the message and forward it to the LL who sent the query 
to the group. The LL will forward the hit to the source’s group, and the group-leader who 
receives the hit will send the message to all of its fellow group-leaders. The group-leader who 
received the file query from the user-node will forward the message to that query source. The hit 
will traverse the user-nodes of the query’s source until the source finally receives the message. 
At this point, the query author should forward the hit to a random group-member to create 
deniability. Again, let node A be the query author, let node B be the node forwarding the hit to 
A. If node A forwards the hit to another node (C), B cannot determine if A is the query author. 
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The forwarding should continue until a node has received the message twice or the forwarding 
probability has not been satisfied. 
EPrB(“QH”|| QID|| HIDB || FIDB || GroupIDB || IP:PortMM || TS || File Info) 
Above is the initial file hit the hit source will send transmit. PrB is the private key of the 
hit’s source, Node B. The text encompassed by EPrB is encrypted using the private key of B. 
“QH” lets the message destination (the node receive this message next) knows that this message 
is a query hit. QID is the query ID this hit message is replying to. HIDB is the hit ID which 
should be unique to all other hits to this query generated from this node to this query ID. FIDB is 
the forward ID used to monitor nodes forwarding habits. GroupIDB is the group ID of group 
where the hit source resides in. This ID is used to identify where query hits and file transfers are 
coming from. The GroupID is specified by one of the hit source’s group-leaders and is verified 
by the LL. Upon initial query creation, the query author specifies the group ID. Following the 
group ID is the IP and port of a middle-man that leads to the transfer of the requested file. This 
IP address must belong to a group-member of the hit source’s group. It is important that middle-
men are rotated to prevent any group-member overwhelmed by servicing too many file transfer 
requests. Next is the time stamp of when the query message was generated, followed by the file 
information containing the file name, file description, file offset and length, hash, and other vital 
information in regard to the file. 
 
File Requests: Once a query hit has been returned to the query source (node A), a file request 
can be performed. To protect A’s identity, A has the option to connect to the middle-man directly 
or ask another user-node in the group to connect on its behalf. If the request is forwarded to 
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another group-member, that node has the option to connect to the middle-man directly or 
forward the request again. Similar to forwarding file queries, this decision to connect to the 
middle-man or forward the request is base on a forward probability. It is essential that the 
number of forwards is low since long chains from a file query author to the hit author will create 
noticeable delays in the file transfer. Once a node from A’s group connects to the middle-man of 
B’s group specified in the hit message, the middle man will connect to a user-node in its group 
(node C) and request the file. If C does not have the requested file in its shared files or cache, it 
will forward the request to another group member who will perform the same recursive search. 
When a node with the file receives the forwarded search message, it will forward the request just 
like file queries and reply with the requested fragment of the file with a delay. The fragment is 
transferred the reverse path back to A.  
EPrA(“FR”|| FRID|| FIDA || IP:PortMM || TS || File Hash || File Offset|| File Length) 
Above is the message for a file request. It represents the message transferred from A to 
the next node in the path to B. “FR” represents that this message is a file request. FRID is the file 
request identification used to distinguish file requests. FIDA is the forward ID used to make sure 
nodes are forward the message. IP:PortMM is the IP and port number of the middle-man of the 
file source’s group who is listening for incoming connections for file requests. TS is the time 
stamp of the message initialization. File Hash is the hash of the requested file to be transmitted. 
File offset is the beginning offset of the requested file’s segment. File length is the distances 
from the offset to the requested file segment length. 
It is important to note that the hit source’s identity is never truly known by the query’s 
author. From this, nodes cannot rate individual node file transfers but can leave evaluations about 
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interactions with other groups. The goal of this is to force groups to maintain a healthy level of 
behavior and isolate malicious nodes.  
 
Interaction Receipts: Interaction receipts are evidence that two nodes interacted. They are used 
to provide nodes with proof of forwarding and receiving messages. Interaction receipts here are 
very similar to the ones described in [25]. The receipts in SARP Net are the only pieces of 
evidence a node can use to accuse another node of not forwarding messages or message 
tampering. Each receipt is signed by the two interacting nodes’ private keys. For instance, if 
node A sent node B a message, the message would contain text encrypted in A’s private key. 
Once B receives the message, it will reply to A with the same message encrypted in B’s private 
key along with other data. B will also forward the receipt to a third-party node that A can access. 
If two user-nodes are interacting, the receipt will be sent to one of their group-leaders. If a user-
node and group-leader interact, the receipt is forwarded to another group-leader. If another 
group-leader is not available, the receipt will be sent to other user-nodes. 
Node B will append to the reply receipt (the receipt from B to A) its next forward ID. The 
forward ID is a number that represents the identifier B will use to forward another node the 
original message. For example, if B forwards the message to C, that message will have B’s 
forward ID. Since the reply receipt has the forward ID from B to C, node A can query a node that 
is visible to itself for the forwarding receipt C generated after receiving the message from B. 
With the reply receipt node C sends B, B can forward that reply receipt to A, so now A has proof 
that B forwarded the message to some one. If a node does not receive a forwarding-receipt from 
a node, that node can always query neighboring nodes for the receipt. If no receipt is received, 
then a node knows either the non-forwarding node is either misbehaving, was providing message 
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cover to protect a query author’s identity, or is the source of the file for file transfers. Since 
nodes forward hit messages even if it is the query author, queries are difficult to track who is the 
query author without mass collaboration. For file transfers, the failure to produce a receipt allows 
groups to pinpoint which nodes are transmitting malware without knowing which filenames 
produced the query response and divulging information about what files nodes are downloading 
and which files nodes are sharing. 
 
Reputation Messages: Reputation messages are what distribute node ratings across the network. 
Once a node rates another group, it must distribute the message so it will propagate throughout 
the network, spreading that node’s opinion about the group being rated. The fastest and most 
common way for a node to alert other groups about a particular group’s behavior is from file 
transfers. Once a file has been evaluated by a node, that node will send a reputation message 
along the same path as the file transfer traversed, from the rating node, through intermediate 
nodes in the same group (if any), to the middle-man, through intermediate nodes of the file 
source’s group (if any), to eventually the file source. The first node along that chain that cannot 
produce a receipt saying that it received the file fragment from someone else will be determined 
the file source. The node that locates this file source will send a message to its group-leaders 
with the interaction receipt that it received the file fragment from the file source along with the 
reputation message coming from the node that made the query, also known as the file’s final 
destination. Also, the file’s final destination node will spread the reputation to all of its group 
members and to the group-leaders of the file source’s group to notify the group of the incident. 
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Interaction and Reputation Queries: Interaction and reputation queries propagate differently. 
Interaction queries are almost always needed for proof of interaction within the same leader-
group, meaning that the interaction is normally for someone governed by the same leader-of-
leaders. With that said, these queries have a HTL is set to 1. If the receipt is needed for a node 
outside of the leader-group, then the HTL can be increased. Reputation queries traverse the 
network the same way as file queries. Its HTL should be higher than interaction queries in order 
to poll a larger number of groups. Ideally, this HTL should be set between 4 and 6, depending on 
the say of the network and the number of nodes. 
5.4 Fragment Caching: 
SARP Net incorporates caching of file fragments to increase transfer speeds. Each node 
has the ability to set a cache limit which will store as much data as that limit allows of fragments 
a node receives as an intermediate node or middle-man node during file transfer. Each cache 
entry will have metadata that will contain information about how that node received the 
fragment. This includes the interaction receipt and the fragment’s hash value. It should be noted 
that only a file source can reply to a file query as a query hit. Cache hits should only take place 
during file requests. If a file request comes in for a particular hash value, any node with that file 
fragment can reply. This allows for swarming/multi-source file transfers from one group to 
another. It is multi-sourced since when a file request is forwarded by a middle-man. Middle-men 
randomly select nodes to forward requests to. If this is done for different file fragments that are 
stored through out the group, an entire file’s fragments could all be transmitted to the middle-
man by different nodes.  
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All reputation ratings are tied with the fragment’s original source. This makes it the sole 
responsibility of nodes to share benevolent files. If a node possesses a malicious file fragment in 
its cache, it should remove the fragment as soon as the reputation message is received. Violators 
can be found with query probes by group-leaders to locate misbehaving nodes.  
Cache entries should only contain the most requested fragments while respecting a set 
time-to-live (TTL). A node should delete a fragment from cache when the fragment’s source (the 
node that sent the fragment) disconnects from the network. This makes it easier for nodes to 
locate file origins when a rating is returned. 
5.5 Group-Based Reputation Scheme: 
The reputation scheme employed by SARP Net is a simple group-based scheme. Instead of 
rating each node individually to attempt to predict node behavior based on previous experiences 
noted by other users, this reputation scheme evaluates a group of individuals’ network behavior 
and applies the rating to everyone in the group. The basis of this idea comes from the proverb “it 
takes a village to raise a child”. In this case, groups are responsible for their group-members 
while group-members are responsible for their groups. If a group-member misbehaves, the entire 
group suffers. This forces responsible group-leaders to govern their group-members very strictly. 
The consequences of group-leaders not maintaining good behaving group-members should see 
those group-leaders being demoted and potentially suspended or exiled from the group. Group 
leaders have the tools to determine which nodes are misbehaving in the form of interaction 
receipts and reputation messages propagating back from other groups. 
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 Groups that misbehave suffer the consequence of not having queries forwarded and 
answered from other groups. Since file queries and file downloads drive the demand of using 
file-sharing applications, the lost privilege of file querying severely hurt the group’s 
functionality. It is assumed that nodes of misbehaving groups would soon want to participate in 
file queries and eventually leave a group to join a reputable one. This is why it is important for 
group-leaders to be swift when it comes to filtering out misbehaving nodes. 
 The rating calculation is relatively simple. Nodes rate good interactions with positive 1, 
neutral interactions with a 0, and negative interactions with -1. Positive interactions for file 
transfers can be for files that contained no malware and have a file name that accurately 
describes the file’s contents. Neutral interactions are for events that could not be determined if it 
was a positive or negative event. Negative interactions are for events that were poor, such as 
malware distribution and occurrences of dummy files. If a rating is negative then interaction with 
that group is not suggested. If a group’s reputation is neutral then it is considered a 50/50 chance 
of the node being malicious or information is not gathered about that group. Positive ratings 
mean there is a higher chance of a good interaction would occur. It is important to note that since 
reputations are solely based on previous interactions with a group’s group-members, the 
reputation scheme cannot guarantee that any future interaction will be innocent or malicious.  
To prevent any one group’s opinion of another group from dominating an overall 
reputation, averages are used to normalize ratings among other groups. We will denote the group 
being evaluated as the target group. To calculate a group’s reputation, a node will query the 
network for any occurrences of reputations for the target group. After waiting (approximately 1 
minute), each returned reputation message is gathered and duplicates are discarded. The 
reputation scheme calculates the target group’s rating by summing the average of each returned 
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group’s total unique rating of the target then dividing that sum by the number of groups that 
returned reputation messages. For example, if group A was the target group and if group B had 2 
unique ratings of A {1,0} and group C had 3 unique ratings of A {-1, 1, 1}, the following 
calculations would occur. First each group’s rating is averaged: Group B’s average rating of A is 
0.5. Group C’s rating of A is 0.333. Second, the two averages are summed and divided by the 
number of groups that returned messages: 0.41665. In this case, group A would be considered 
trustworthy. For group-leaders evaluating its group-members, a node is considered malicious and 
should be punished if its overall rating is negative and 3 or more groups have rated it. This is the 
default rule for determining if a node is truly malicious. For any case of negative ratings, group-
leaders can configure their own rule set for determining when to punish a node. One such rule 
may be evaluating each negative reputation message’s interaction receipts to determine if the 
allegation is plausible. 
The following represents the equation to determine a group’s reputation rating. Rx is the 
overall rating of group x. n is the number of groups with at least one rating of group x. ri,x bar is 
the average rating from group i on group x.  
 
By rating groups, node retaliation for setting negative or neutral reputation ratings are 
almost eliminated since individual nodes are not being rated. The only form of retaliation could 
be entire groups attempting to sabotage other group ratings by flooding the network with false 
reputations. For starters, each reputation message needs to have interaction receipts appended to 
it to prove that the interaction actually took place. The second tool against this form of retaliation 
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is how the system calculates reputations to normalize group responses with other groups. No one 
group could dominate the evaluation of another.  
5.6 Addressed Security Issues: 
Intrusion and Malware Detection: SARP Net was designed to be coupled with an intrusion 
detection system (IDS) and an anti-virus software in order to promote security across the 
network. If each node is executing some form of these two tools, malware detection and 
malicious nodes can be identified faster and more efficiently. The SARP Net client software 
should be implemented with the functionality of easily tying itself with an IDS and anti-virus of 
the user’s choice. This feature would guarantee that the communication between the applications 
would protect the user’s machine and others in the network by constantly monitoring incoming 
data. If an anti-virus application could automatically scan files as soon as they are transmitted, 
reputations can be generated as quickly based on the outcome of file scans. With SARP Net’s 
ability to send messages with an author’s group reputation, security warnings can be propagated 
through out the network, alerting nodes of malicious activity and updating both IDS’s and anti-
virus applications of things to look out for. Of course such alerts would not be the only 
verification since even the highly reputable nodes can be malicious, but could be accompanied 
by the software or user contacting the IDS or anti-virus’s company directly for verification.  
 
Anonymity as a Security Tool: It is hoped that with an anonymous P2P network, the protection 
from identifying user activity would increase a node’s security. Attacks like spyware’s 
information gathering on incoming query hits should suffer greatly. This is true since nodes are 
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expected to accept query hits from other nodes with the intention for forward it to the source. 
This load of data makes it hard to distinguish the source of a query. 
 The amount of cover that groups provide their members is essential to protect identities. 
The scale of the cover creates a level of deniability nodes can have of query and reputation 
making and file possession. The higher the cover: the higher the level of deniability. Groups 
fewer than 4 nodes suffer from a higher probability of being able to pinpoint which nodes are 
making which queries and sharing which files in its own group. A solution is to prevent group-
members from replying to fellow group-member queries with hits if the group is too few 
connected nodes.  
 The risk of Sybil attacks [8] are also addressed in SARP Net. With its design, SARP Net 
makes it possible for nodes to own more than one identity on the network. The worst case would 
be for malicious nodes to create malicious groups with the sole intent to spread malware or to 
harm the system. The limitations on group formations, limitations on node invitations, and 
monitoring which nodes have created groups should hold against any large collaboration from 
misbehaving. Simply put, groups consisting of malicious nodes will receive poor reputations and 
will be detected. Once identified, neighboring groups and overseeing LL’s will do their part and 
discontinue a group’s privileges if malicious activity is taking place or be judged negatively by 
benevolent groups. In the case of a single node performing a Sybil attack, the limitation on the 
number of invitations a node can give out prevent a node from creating a lot of identities easily. 
By forcing nodes to behave correctly for a set online-time, sharing a set amount of data, and 
obtaining positive ratings before gaining the right to invite a new group-member, Sybil attacks 
are highly discouraged. In addition, each node is linked to the node that referred it to the 
network, just like in F2F networks. A system could be employed to where if a node is detected as 
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malicious, its referring node suffers. The blame on introducing malicious nodes can recursively 
trek its way to a large degree of referrers to punish nodes of allowing malicious nodes to infect 
the system. 
5.7 Prototype: 
 To determine the feasibility of SARP Net, a small prototype of its highlighted features 
was implemented. File queries, requests, and their responses were all designed for this prototype. 
Interaction receipt exchange and queries, as well as reputation generation and requests were left 
out to focus on the transfer of anonymous files and the system’s node join/leave management. 
The prototype was designed in Java 5 for portability and consisted of separate client and 
bootstrap server applications.  
The client application allows users to join groups, share files, make queries, and interact 
with other users securely and anonymously. The bootstrap server provides each client with a 
single starting entry point to the system. This server is used for nodes that lack any knowledge of 
other active nodes on the network. Clients can bypass the bootstrap server by connecting to an 
active node’s IP and port if are known. For the sake of testing purposes, the bootstrap server 
automatically assigns incoming nodes to groups and which role they should portray. For nodes 
who bypass the bootstrap server, if the incoming node belongs to the group of the active node, 
the active node will send information about its group-leaders so a connection can be made 
between the incoming node and the group-leaders. Here, group-leaders will assign the incoming 
node as another group-leader or user-node. 
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The bootstrap server has the additional task of providing users who are not running the 
client software to query and download files through a website hosted by the bootstrap. With this 
feature, users can connect to the network to download files from any computer in the world 
without the need to install the client software. To deter users from only using this web feature, 
usernames and passwords are required to track the number of downloads. Also, users of the 
website are not returned group ratings with their file queries nor are they allowed to rate groups 
based on their interactions. 
All SARP Net key pairs were generated with the RSA algorithm to provide the necessary 
asymmetric keys. Key pair generation was performed by each node upon joining the network for 
the first time. After being assigned to a group, a node was given the group’s key pair and 
generates its own identification key pair as described earlier. The node’s identification public key 
was then sent to the bootstrap server for storage. Any node that needs a public key of any group 
or any user can request one from this server. Once all of the needed keys have been exchanged or 
generated, a node could participate in the network securely by decrypting incoming data and 




 Figure 5: SARP Net Prototype: File Query Web Results 
 
During prototype testing, one bootstrap server and 7 client instances were executed on the 
3 different computers. The resulting network topology was 2 groups with 3 members each, one 
leader-of-leader, and one bootstrap server. Figure 5 displays a screen shot of the results returned 
to a web user after a file query with the search string of “pdf”. The green hyperlinks to the far 
left of the web browser are the download links for the returned files. These links points to the 
hit’s middle-man’s computer and begins the file request process. Queries and requests 
originating from web users slightly deviated from the routing protocol described in section 5.3. 
These users connect directly from to the middle-man during file requests and forward file queries 
to the bootstrap server. Obviously, file queries channeled through the bootstrap server are not 
anonymous and can be traced; this being another incentive for users to install and use the client 
software. 
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The prototype showed that data could easily flow from group-to-group under small and 
favorable conditions without any difficulties. It also showed that the system is feasible in node 
management and data transfers. The system proved to be able to handle nodes joining and 
leaving the system gracefully with the aid of group-members constantly updating each others 
statuses. File transfers with both the use of hops for anonymous routing and with the use of the 
web feature, proved reasonably successful with files making their way from a source to the query 
author. 
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CHAPTER SIX: DATA ANALYSIS 
The following section describes the experiments that were performed to analyze the 
proposed network and reputation scheme. Section 6.1 is an overview of the P2P simulator that 
was developed. Section 6.2 describes the first experiment performed with the simulator. Sections 
6.3 and 6.4 discuss experiments 2 and 3 which extend the first experiment with the goal of 
increasing transfer speeds. 
6.1 Simulator Overview: 
 A number of simulators were considered to evaluate the performance of SARP Net under 
several different configurations, including 3LS [24], P2P Sim [10], and PeerSim [14]. Due to the 
desire to simulate the unique features the system possesses in detail, such as the reputation 
scheme and interaction receipts, the simulator used in PGS Net [19] was used for its ability to 
simulate a network structure similar to SARP Net. This simulator was modified to support the 
proposed architecture, its routing protocol, and security mechanisms. The simulator’s design was 
heavily influenced by [26] for system comparison detailed later. The simulator was used to 
monitor the network behavior and feasibility of the system. The simulator, renamed to SARP-
Sim, is a discrete event simulator fully implemented in Java. Similar to [26], encryption is not 
performed at any point in the simulation and nodes joining and leaving the network are not 
simulated. The simulator pre-establishes the network with node placement and their web of 
interconnectivity.  
To examine the different network structures SARP Net can be given, the simulator allows 
for the specification of different group sizes and assignments of the three node roles based on 
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configured inputs. The characteristics that heavily affect a node’s functionality in the network are 
the different bandwidth limitations and number of shared files. Both of these attributes are 
randomly selected based on a specified distribution to give nodes the ability to accurately 
simulate real user machines on the internet. 
Each simulated node is represented by additional real world characteristics such as 
bandwidth, listing of shared files, malicious intent, and cache size. Nodes are given a number of 
shared files that they will offer to other nodes to download. To simulate this feature, the 
randomized number of shared files per node is used to represent the list of files to share. This is a 
list of integer numbers ranging between 0 to the number of possible file name combinations 
specified by simulator input. For instance, if the number of combinations is 200,000 and node A 
has 1,000 files to share, that node has a list of 1,000 randomized numbers between 0 and 200,000 
without any duplicates. When another node, node B, queries A for a file, B will randomly select 
a number between 0 and 200,000 (call it random_file) and ask A for that file. Node A will 
respond with file query hits for every instance of files in the list that are in the range of 
(random_file-100, random_file+100) to simulate if B queries non-specific files. An example of 
this would be if B is looking for all files that have filenames that contain the word “document”; a 
single node may share a lot of files with the phrase “document” in its filename and should reply 
with them all. 
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6.2 Experiment 1: 
 SARP Net was simulated using SARP-Sim for 10 runs to determine the average system 
statistics. 10 runs were performed since there are a number of random variations per simulation 
run. Each run simulated the P2P network for 3600 seconds (1 hour) with 4,000 nodes processing 
messages and interacting with each other. Of these 4,000 nodes, 200 groups were formed with 20 
group members each. A 5:1 ration of user-nodes to group-leader was used. In addition, each 
leader-group was assigned to oversee 3 groups where each leader-group was comprised of the 3 
fastest group-members. As recommended by the protocol, leader-of-leaders are the only nodes 
prohibited to make file requests and share files. This is to help ease the large workload of 
message forwarding and group-governing expected of these leaders. 
 The method of assigning bandwidth and number of shared files for each node were 
comprised of the findings in [23], [26], [17]. 70% of all nodes had high speed internet 
connections. Of those nodes, 90% had cable or DSL connections and 10% had T1 or T3 
connections. Of the 30% dial-up nodes, 60% possessed 33.6-56kbps connections, 15% possessed 
64-128kbps connections, and 25% used 14.4-28.8kbps connections.  
 The number of shared files was determined by the bandwidth, as influenced by the results 
in [23]. The dial-up nodes had a 20% chance of sharing no files, 60% probability of sharing 
between 0 and 100 files, 14% chance of sharing between 100 and 1,000 files, and a 6% chance of 
sharing 1,000 to 10,000 files. The high-speed nodes had a 10% chance of sharing no files, 60% 
chance of sharing 0 to 100 files, 24% chance of sharing 100 to 1,000 files, and 6% chance of 
sharing 1,000 to 10,000 files. 
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 2,500 file queries were processed randomly throughout the simulated time. Each node 
was given an equally-likely chance of making any of the 2,500 file queries at any given time. 
Each query’s HTL was set to 5. For 20 percent of all query hits returned, the query author 
produced a reputation query for the hit source’s group and waited 60 seconds to receive the 
group’s rating. If the group’s rating is greater than or equal to 0 then the query source would 
issue a file request for the file returned in the hit. Additional file transfer settings include: all file 
transfers represent a 1 MB fragment of the queried file, each node has a cache size of 50 entries 
(50 MBs each), and the forward probability, probability of a node connecting to a specified 
middle-man or forwarding the request to another group-member,  was 50%. 
 To test SARP Net’s ability to locate and punish malicious nodes, all nodes were given a 
20% chance of being malicious since this allows for a large proportion of the network to be 
benevolent while having a large enough visible proportion of the network misbehaving. All 
malicious nodes transfer malware 80% of the time and it is up to the file requestor to detect if a 
transferred file is indeed malware. 5% of all files transferred by each innocent node were 
malware, the rest are benevolent files. With this said, if a hit’s source transmits a malicious file, 
it is assumed that the requestor will be able to detect the malware and will distribute a negative 
rating for every occurrence. Group-leaders will disable a node’s file sharing privileges if it has an 
overall negative reputation and 3 or more groups have produced ratings on it. This loss of 
privilege can represent a node being expelled or suspended from the group.  
 These experiments focus on malware detection and eliminating the spread of malicious 
files by locating its source. Even though a node refusing to forward messages is a problem this 
protocol addresses, nodes are not judged on this criterion in the simulation. Instead the load that 
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interaction receipts place on the network is monitored for their effect on query response and 
transfer speeds. 
6.2.1 Results: 
The experiment yielded many noteworthy results. The following results are averages over 
the 10 runs of the simulator. All experiment data averages and standard deviations can be found 
in the appendix. 
Search Results: Of the 2,500 file requests, close to 225,422 hits were generated from 404,304 
file searches, with about 224,828 of them reaching the file query author. The average time for the 
first query hit was 7.11 seconds. These query hits spawned 40,260 file requests resulting in 
30,935 uploads attempted, 2,729 downloads completed, and 19,175 file fragments transferred 
including downloads from hops and the file request author.  
File Transfer and Bandwidth Statistics: Even though the average bandwidth for each node 
was 78.05 kB/s, the average download speed was 7.06 kB/s. This download speed was the 
average transfer rate from the last hop to the file request author. It took an average of 701.19 
seconds for a node to receive a file after issuing a file request. This delay is directly related to the 
number of hops from the file request author to the file’s source. It is the time needed for each hop 
to receive the file plus the time for locating the file’s source. Finally, the system used less than 
21% of its bandwidth to process requests, responses and transfer files over the hour. 
Malicious Activity Detection: The system performed relatively well in detecting malicious 
activity. Of the close to 800 averaged malicious nodes in the network, just over 112 of them were 
correctly detected within an hour. Unexpectedly, an average of 3 benevolent nodes was detected 
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malicious per run. This false-positive rate is due to the low probability of 5% that each 
benevolent node had to share an unknown version of malware. These nodes beat the odds and 
generated overall negative ratings with more than 2 groups. The system was able warn 
approximately 4,078 returned hits of being malicious from the hit’s group behavior.  
Figure 5 shows the percentage of free and used bandwidth of all nodes over the course of 
the simulated hour. This graph proves that as time progresses in the simulation, nodes begin to 
issue more and more queries, transmit files, and send reputation and interaction receipt messages. 
The decrease in free bandwidth percentage in the first 300 seconds is due to the network 
increasing the amount of messages and network activity. Around the 300 second mark, the 
bandwidth demand begins to stabilize around 79% free. Towards the end of the simulation, the 
free bandwidth percentage begins to increase again since most of the file requests have been 
completed. 
Figure 6 shows that the increased number of reputations created and the number of 
malicious nodes are related since malicious node detection relies on the spreading of reputation 
messages. As time progresses, more reputations are made since the number of completed 
downloads are increasing. The slower ascent of malicious node detects to number of reputations 
in the system is due to the amount of confirmation group-leaders need before declaring a node 
malicious. 
 Figure 7 displays the percentage of network activity from the total bandwidth utilization. 
The most bandwidth usage comes from file transfers, making up 42% of all bandwidth 
utilization. This large portion is due to the data hopping caused by file requests. With nodes 
providing cover for file sources and query authors, the number of hops requires nodes to 
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continuously forward file fragments. Interactions make up 38% of the bandwidth utilization 
since receipts are spawned from file and reputation queries, requests, hits, and transfers. 











































































Figure 7: Percentage of Bandwidth Utilization for Experiment 1 
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Figure 8: Reputations Created and Malicious Node Detection vs. Time (Experiment 1) 
 
6.3 Experiment 2:  
After noticing the delay the hops place on file transfers, another experiment was 
executed, this time decreasing the size of groups from 20 to 10 nodes, setting the number of 
groups to 400 to still simulate 4,000 nodes in the network. An additional change included the 
assignment of a group-leader for every three user-nodes. All other simulation settings were kept 
the same as the first experiment. 
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With the new change in topology, a few statistics were improved while others saw the 
opposite. The noteworthy changes include the transfer statistics and malicious activity detection. 
Over the 10 runs, experiment 2 produced a faster average file transfer speed of 9.30 kB/s, 
compared to experiment 1’s 7.06 kB/s. Also, the average time needed from file request to file 
being transferred back to the request author was 664.17 seconds, 37.02 seconds faster than 
experiment 1’s. Experiment 2 saw the system only detect slightly over 67 malicious nodes 
correctly and an average 1.4 benevolent nodes detected as malicious. 
6.4 Experiment 3: 
Experiment 2 showed that file transfer speeds could be increased with smaller groups 
since there are less nodes to provide cover. These increased speeds were at the cost of fewer 
nodes receiving queries due to the HTL set to 5 and also showed a decrease in malicious node 
detection. To remedy this, a third experiment was devised, this time increasing the HTL to 6. The 
goal of increasing the HTL to 6 was allow more query hits to be generated and increase node 
interaction. All other settings were left the same as experiment 2. 
Of the 514, 797 file searches from the 2,500 file queries, there were 275, 511 hits. On 
average, 7.26 seconds were needed for the first query hit to make its way back to the query 
author. The query authors saw an average download speed of 11.3 kB/s and waited 183.79 
seconds for each file. Malicious node detection was at its lowest in this experiment. Only 16 
malicious nodes were detected of the 796 in the network. 
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6.5 Discussion: 
After seeing the results the experiments yielded, it is clear that SARP Net can accurately 
detect malicious activity with an extremely low false-positive rate. The level of accuracy is high 
since the system labeled nodes that transmitted malware as malicious regardless if the node was 
initially flagged as benevolent or not. This is because of the probability all nodes had of 
transmitting malware. With the high percentage of malicious distribution for malicious users and 
the extremely low percentage for benevolent users, benevolent nodes should typically produce 
positive ratings. Nodes initially set as malicious should almost always produce negative ratings. 
Even though none of the experiments correctly identified all of the malicious nodes and 
the simulator assumes every node has an extremely accurate anti-virus, SARP Net’s level of 
detection is commendable. Since the system’s rating depends on the number of uploads nodes 
perform, the simulation would have to guarantee that each node makes a large number of uploads 
to multiple groups to be detected. The reputation scheme works well with detecting nodes that 
consistently act maliciously. The true detection takes place at the group level, where groups must 
incorporate a set of detection rules described earlier. 
It is difficult to compare SARP Net with other anonymous P2P file-sharing systems due 
to the system’s goals, design, and functionality. Regardless, SARP-Sim was designed to produce 
measurements to compare SARP Net with the experiment results of Freenet described in [26] 
and its simulator Eos. Since Freenet and SARP Net are different in functionality (Freenet is an 
anonymous distributed data storage and SARP Net is a distributed file-sharing network where 
nodes know what files they are sharing and has caching capabilities), file transfers and 
bandwidth utilization are the most comparable metrics of the two systems. [26] presented 
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modifications to the Freenet design in order to increase file transfer speeds. The paper leaves 
doubt of whether the system still protects user identities, so only the results for the original 
Freenet protocol will be compared. Freenet’s average download speed was simulated to be 
between 9.7 kB/s for the nodes with fast internet connects and 6.2 kB/s for slow, dial-up nodes. 
With an average download speed of 7.1 kB/s in experiment 1, 9.3 kB/s in experiment 2, and 
11.29 kB/s in experiment 3, SARP Net’s file transfer speeds are very much comparable with 
Freenet’s. With about 70% of all nodes in the simulation of Freenet having high speed internet 
connections, one can deduce that an average file transfer speed of both fast and slow nodes is 
8.65 kB/s. Compared to this average, SARP Net outperforms Freenet by 30.5%. The same could 
not be said for total bandwidth utilization. Freenet’s bandwidth utilization for both download and 
upload combined averaged 4.98% usage, where SARP Net’s nodes used 20% in experiment 1, 
14% in experiment 2, and 17% in experiment 3.  
It is gathered that SARP Net’s load on bandwidth utilization does not necessarily mean 
the existence of network inefficiency but that nodes are trying to processes more system 
functions such as the addition of interaction receipts and reputations than Freenet. One can 
conclude that SARP Net’s bandwidth utilization is a tradeoff for its improved security measures 
in an anonymous environment. 
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Figure 10: Bandwidth Utilization of SARP Net vs. Freenet
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CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION 
7.1 Conclusion: 
In this paper, SARP Net, a secure, anonymous, reputation-based, P2P network was 
described in detail. The protocol is secure due to the necessity of all nodes exchanging encrypted 
messages and incorporating third-party intrusion detection system and anti-virus software to 
protect nodes. The anonymity of nodes is guaranteed through the notion of hop making, using 
nodes in the network as cover to allow for deniability for network activity. The reputation 
scheme incorporated in the system rates collections of nodes as groups and not based on 
individual efforts. This sense of group-rating places the emphasis that group overseers (known as 
group-leaders in this system) are responsible for detecting and filtering out malicious nodes. 
Groups that do not adequately punish malicious activity will suffer in reputation across the 
network, limiting its ability to participate in the network fully. The reputation scheme is used to 
promote a healthy network setting and can be expanded to aid other network features such as 
broadcasting network alerts and distributing malware detection signatures.  
Through simulation, the performance of SARP Net under common real-world file-
sharing conditions was evaluated. The simulation showed that the concept of SARP Net is very 
feasible at handling the network load of file queries, responses, interaction receipts, file transfers, 
and reputation messages. In comparison to the anonymous distributed data store Freenet, SARP 
Net’s file transfers were faster by 30.5% with small group size configurations, while its 
bandwidth utilization could be nearly 3 times as high. It is concluded that the additional 
70 
bandwidth usage is the acceptable tradeoff for a more secure, anonymous, data sharing 
environment.  
7.2 Future Work: 
This paper’s focus on file-sharing should not limit the potential of SARP Net. The 
protocol is so robust that distributed computing, file storage, and data mining are a few of the 
extensions that can be added to the system with relative ease. With this said, SARP Net is a work 
in progress. This paper outlines the basic structure and routing protocol of the anonymous 
system. Several future enhancements will help booster the performance of the network, increase 
its security, and perform better analysis on the system. One such enhancement would be a 
completely decentralized method of verifying and distributing encryption keys. Eliminating the 
dependence for a long-lived, dedicated server would make the system more fault-tolerant and 
eradicate the notion of having a single point of failure. 
A second future extension would be to expand the SARP-Sim simulator to compare the 
system with a wider range of similar protocols. The analysis comparing SARP Net with Freenet 
in these experiments is adequate for initial evaluations but to truly see how well SARP Net 
compares with other systems, the simulator will need to gain the capability of simulating other 
systems also. This extension would compare SARP Net to other anonymous P2P systems under 
the exact same environment with the same workload, providing detailed analysis for 
comparisons. 
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APPENDIX: EXPERIMENT RESULTS 
Experiment 1’s Average Results Over 10 Runs 
 Average Standard Deviation 
Number of initial file queries: 2500.0 0.0 
Number of nodes: 4000.0 0.0 
Number of file searches performed: 404304.2 5534.481471646644 
Number of hits: 225421.8 6013.063492097852 
Number of hits returned: 224827.8 6113.911216234662 
Average time for first query hit: 7.1145200000000015 0.07365238353237458 
Number of repeated messages ignored: 312642.6 12971.762472385934 
Number of file requests: 40260.2 1146.696019004165 
Number of uploads: 30934.9 886.9357868526898 
Number of downloads: 2729.1 172.95863667362784 
Number of file fragments transferred: 19174.8 722.4813907638037 
Number of reputations created: 2729.1 172.95863667362784 
Malicious Activity 
Number of potentially malicious files 
avoided: 
4077.7 435.2344310828361 
Number of malicious files transferred: 523.2 52.17815634918505 
Number of pending downloads awaiting 
reputations: 
650.2 176.84897511718862 
Number of malicious nodes in the 
network: 
799.5 23.070543990118654 
Total nodes detected malicious: 115.4 26.306653150866612 
Number of malicious nodes detected 
malicious: 
112.4 24.747525128788133 




Average bandwidth (kB/sec) : 78.0461317626953 1.3858429796927754 
Average file transfer speed (kB/sec) : 7.062409066180429 0.26563754380302523 
Average time from file request to 
download complete (sec) : 
701.1927336489005 16.678891706989166 
Average free bandwidth percentage : 0.793335419448687 0.003682867553909222 
Average used bandwidth percentage : 0.2066645805513136 0.003682867553909413 




Experiment 2’s Average Results Over 10 Runs 
 Average Standard Deviation 
Number of initial file queries: 2500.0 0.0 
Number of nodes: 4000.0 0.0 
Number of file searches performed: 246855.8 2648.7307073388943 
Number of hits: 130138.7 1399.781557958241 
Number of hits returned: 129828.8 1374.8142274503855 
Average time for first query hit: 6.62388 0.06584467784111334 
Number of repeated messages ignored: 51676.1 2093.5280007680813 
Number of file requests: 24006.2 304.74047975285464 
Number of uploads: 15265.2 252.31837031813598 
Number of downloads: 1938.4 154.00792187416855 
Number of file fragments transferred: 7238.3 433.55969600505995 
Number of reputations created: 1938.4 154.00792187416855 
Malicious Activity 
Number of potentially malicious files 
avoided: 
1517.0 168.7601848778319 
Number of malicious files transferred: 352.2 35.66174420860539 
Number of pending downloads awaiting 
reputations: 
434.9 79.32395602842814 
Number of malicious nodes in the 
network: 
786.8 24.457309745759037 
Total nodes detected malicious: 68.8 14.281456508353763 
Number of malicious nodes detected 
malicious: 
67.4 13.676256797823008 




Average bandwidth (kB/sec) : 78.65115505371095 2.0156175707428714 
Average file transfer speed (kB/sec) : 9.301385378457507 0.48468675630299246 
Average time from file request to 
download complete (sec) : 
664.1707861042386 23.97132430102859 
Average free bandwidth percentage : 0.8572273556297519 0.003398113633826803 
Average used bandwidth percentage : 0.1427726443702491 0.0033981136338265263 




Experiment 3’s Average Results Over 10 Runs 
 Average Standard Deviation 
Number of initial file queries: 2500.0 0.0 
Number of nodes: 4000.0 0.0 
Number of file searches performed: 514797.1 5297.848118812014 
Number of hits: 275510.9 5088.118482307581 
Number of hits returned: 274562.9 5112.563240684657 
Average time for first query hit: 7.2587600000000005 0.07780045244084366 
Number of repeated messages ignored: 116688.9 6953.88257666176 
Number of file requests: 51414.6 1116.5897366535303 
Number of uploads: 32819.4 675.1056509910135 
Number of downloads: 711.1 49.50242418306401 
Number of file fragments transferred: 8807.0 452.70409761785896 
Number of reputations created: 711.1 49.50242418306401 
Malicious Activity 
Number of potentially malicious files 
avoided: 
2477.5 262.90311903817343 
Number of malicious files transferred: 131.1 14.3 
Number of pending downloads awaiting 
reputations: 
913.6 153.19477797888544 
Number of malicious nodes in the 
network: 
795.8 28.683793333518494 
Total nodes detected malicious: 16.6 4.004996878900157 
Number of malicious nodes detected 
malicious: 
16.4 3.878143885933063 




Average bandwidth (kB/sec) : 78.28282055664063 1.124108825079359 
Average file transfer speed (kB/sec) : 11.29465568974031 0.4547570667552502 
Average time from file request to 
download complete (sec) : 
183.7886331297139 2.179454822931857 
Average free bandwidth percentage : 0.8273814241983551 0.003116775009959704 
Average used bandwidth percentage : 0.17261857580164444 0.003116775009959661 
Table 3: Simulation Results Averaged Over 10 Runs of Simulator for Experiment 3. 
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